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The comment is organized around two questions, which 
were raised after reading the article: The Psychology of Cre-
ativity: A Critical Reading. Is there indeed a crisis, which may 
be threatening the psychology of creativity and if there is 
one, does the solution lie along the lines of developing an 
"increased awareness and responsibility" in relation to the 
future of the discipline.  The discussion of these two ques-
tions is based on the systems conception of creativity.  
More or less systematic reflections on the condition of the psychology of creativity have 
been taking place for years (Chan, 2013; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010; Mayer, 1999; Mumford, 2003; Sawyer, 2012). Perhaps this "concern" results from 
the constantly self-critical stance of research in general, or is a typical feature 
of a "young" sub-discipline requiring support in its development, and intent on construc-
tively overcoming emergent problems (or crises). 
We applaud Professor Glaveanu's attempt to overcome what he characterizes 
as a "pervasive and difficult" crisis in the domain of creativity research. However, we are 
not at all sure that a) there is indeed a crisis which may be threatening the domain, 
b) if there is one, that the solution lies along the lines of developing an "increased aware-
ness and responsibility" in relation to the future of the discipline. Let us discuss these two 
points.  
The author presents the following reasons as evidence that a crisis exists: Creativity 
researchers tend not to reveal their "paradigmatic assumptions" (Glăveanu, 2014, p. 13); 
their questions are "method-driven" (ibid.); underpinning assumptions remain unques-
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tioned (Glăveanu, 2014, p. 14); they tend to fragment the phenomenon studied by being 
too analytic (Glăveanu, 2014, p. 19); by relying too much on psychometrics, by decontex-
tualizing the creative process as if one could actually reproduce it on demand in a labora-
tory situation without compromising the essence of what is being studied.  All of these are 
legitimate points. However, they are not specific to creativity studies, but apply to any 
kind of psychological research, whether neurological, cognitive, social, motivational or 
clinical – when such research is badly conceived and executed. So we take Glăveanu's 
analysis as relevant to all research, not specifically to that focused on creativity.  
The fact is, all research is always in a state of "crisis", by definition. If it were not, 
it would cease to grow and be creative. A few generations ago many physicists were 
of the opinion that their discipline had achieved a stage of maturity, where no further ma-
jor changes could happen. Then, in the first decades of the last century, quantum me-
chanics opened up a whole new range of unknowns for physicists to explore – and tem-
porarily the crisis was averted. 
But let us assume that Glăveanu's analyses are accurate and that the psychology 
of creativity is beset by problems more than other disciplines. How should we go about 
bringing the process back on track? The six steps he lists at the end of the article are rea-
sonable suggestions for any scientist to follow and to pass on to his/her students. Howev-
er, as a generative set of ideas for revitalizing creativity research, we find them rather 
bland and bureaucratic. They bring to mind a story that is told by the descendants 
of Niels Bohr about their illustrious relative. According to the story, after Bohr received his 
Nobel Prize in 1923 for developing the model that started quantum mechanics, he was 
invited to Moscow to give a talk at the lab of Lev Landau, who was the then star of Rus-
sian physics, well supported by the Soviet government. During the visit, a Russian jour-
nalist asked Bohr at a press conference: "Professor Bohr, how do you explain the fact 
that your little lab in the small country of Denmark has achieved such remarkable results 
in physics, while the Moscow lab, despite huge investments by our government, has 
failed to achieve them?" After a minute of hesitation, Bohr answered along the following 
lines: "I think our success is due to the fact that if I make a mistake, anyone in the lab 
feels free to call me stupid." However, either because of a misunderstanding or because 
it seemed a more logical explanation, Bohr's answer was translated into Russian as: ". . . 
Because if anyone in my lab makes a mistake, I feel free to call him stupid." After the con-
ference, the KGB called Landau in, and asked how come he didn't call his students stu-
pid. "But I do, I do . . ." answered poor Landau. "Apparently not often enough!" responded 
the KGB officer and ordered Landau to call his students stupid more often. Even though 




Landau received the Nobel Prize in physics in 1962, his lab did not produce much after 
the cure ordered by the secret police was applied. 
The reason this historical example came to mind after reading Glăveanu's article 
is that creativity rarely flourishes by decree, or by imposing rules, or following plans – no 
matter how reasonable they sound. The one constant requirement for getting to anything 
resembling creativity is unyielding curiosity about a topic that matters to the person more 
than almost anything else (Abuhamdeh & Csikszentmihalyi, 2012). And as for the individ-
ual's contribution – we need freedom, we need stimulation, we need to take risks, we 
need people telling us we are stupid if we make mistakes – but above all else, we need 
the experience of joy that comes from lifting the veil of reality and seeing what might be 
behind it (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). The rest – whatever is required to pur-
sue the curiosity and to bring forth new results – is also necessary, but largely outside the 
control of the person. These are cultural resources and social supports without which, 
even the potentially most creative idea will languish and leave no trace. We do need 
to take into account the socio-cultural matrix if we wish to understand how the ideas ger-
minating in a person's head will turn into components of society and culture (Brannigan, 
1981; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; 1999; Simonton, 1991).   
This view of scientific work, suggests that the crisis indicated by Professor Glaveanu 
may be a natural phase in the development of the field. Socialization to the field 
and achieving a professional level, as well as achieving "peak condition", particularly 
in the social sciences, requires time (Simonton, 1991; 2004). The first presentation 
of a new idea rarely results in success, but assuming things go well, the creator, probably 
after a series of revisions, will have a chance to present the work to a wider audience. 
Recognition of the discovery or innovation in science is measured, inter alia, by the num-
ber of citations and awards (Feist, 1993; 1997); it takes longer when the degree of struc-
ture in the field is looser (Simonton, 2009) and it is difficult to minimize the variance in the 
formal assessments of competent judges (Simonton, 2013). If the theory or method pass-
es all the "tests", it has a chance of entering the domain permanently, be an inspiration 
to other researchers and to be implemented in practice. Professor Glăveanu indicates 
theories that are familiar to every psychologist of creativity (Glăveanu, 2014, p. 12); 
we would like to note, however, that none of them can be seen as new. When we look at 
the list of today's most influential psychologists, including researchers of creativity, we 
can clearly see that their legacy was built up over decades (Diener, Oishi & Park, 2014). 
We are far from arguing that it is enough to ensure freedom to researchers and ask them 
to be patient, and then expect that brilliant theories of creativity and reliable methods 
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of measurements will spring up like mushrooms after the rain. Curiosity, interest, hard 
work – and love of the work itself are also surely needed. Furthermore it is necessary not 
to cut corners, to take the easy way out, and be satisfied with superficial conclusions. In 
other words, if we want the psychology of creativity to gain and maintain respect, we have 
to do good science.  
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